

CDN Incident Alert: 0088. TLP: CLEAR		Date
Title	MD False claim: Maia Sandu will send 700 volunteers to Ukraine after elections	16/09/2025

Summary

- On August 27, the obscure Turkish-language website dikgazete.com published a “leak” claiming that President Maia Sandu would send 700 Moldovan volunteers to Ukraine after the parliamentary elections.
- The narrative aligned with the recurring Kremlin disinformation theme “Moldova is being dragged into war” and was rapidly amplified by Russian media (RIA Novosti, RBK, Lenta), Telegram channels (Gagauznews, Zvezda, etc.), Russian politicians (Nikolai Valuev), and on Facebook and TikTok.
- The claim sought to fuel fears about the ruling government involving Moldova in Russia’s war in Ukraine, in an attempt to undermine Moldova’s pro-EU trajectory.
- The campaign aimed to polarize Moldovan society by leveraging the existing marginal Turkish-language website, creating an inauthentic website to publish false or altered documents, and posting the existing “Moldova is being dragged into war” narrative across multiple social media platforms.
- Recommendations include conducting enhanced monitoring of fringe websites used as disinformation launchpads, reporting coordinated amplification of disinformation to social media platforms, and sharing findings with EU and OSCE election monitoring bodies.

Incident

On August 27, the Turkish website dikgazete.com [published](#) an article titled “President of the Republic of Moldova intends to send 700 volunteers to Ukraine after elections”. The article claimed that a “classified parliamentary leak” on the website [glassmountain.io](#) proved Sandu’s commitment to send volunteers to Ukraine if PAS wins the September 28 elections. The alleged “archive” was later deleted, and there were no other credible confirmations of the leak’s existence.

The disinformation was quickly amplified by Kremlin-approved Russian mainstream outlets, including [RIA Novosti](#), [RBK](#), and [Lenta](#), as well as pro-Kremlin Telegram channels, such as [Gagauznews and Zvezda](#), and by [Nikolai Valuev](#), a member of the Russian State Duma. Numerous Facebook and TikTok accounts further spread the message through posts and videos.

The incident aimed to undermine Sandu and PAS, portray the EU as dragging Moldova into Russia’s war in Ukraine, and fuel fear among Moldovan citizens during the election campaign.

Systemic violation assessment

This case illustrates a **coordinated disinformation tactic** frequently used by Kremlin-aligned actors. The manipulation is twofold:

- **Content manipulation:** fabricated claims about a “leak’s” existence and false claims about the “leak” containing evidence of Sandu’s government coordinating to send 700 volunteers to Ukraine;
- **Tactical manipulation:** use of obscure foreign sources (dikgazete.com, glassmountain.io) to create a false sense of legitimacy, followed by coordinated amplification in Kremlin-approved Russian mainstream media and on social platforms.

The incident poses **a direct risk to the integrity of the Moldovan parliamentary elections**, as it seeks to erode trust in the pro-EU government and instill fear of war. Such disinformation could be considered illegal under Moldovan electoral and media legislation, which prohibits the dissemination of false information intended to manipulate voters.

Narrative

Meta-narrative: The West is dragging Moldova into war.

Sub-narratives: Maia Sandu and PAS plan to militarize Moldova under NATO/EU pressure; Moldova will lose its neutrality if PAS wins the elections; Russia stands for peace; the West brings war.

Impact

Reach: Amplified by major Russian outlets (RIA Novosti, RBK, Lenta), widely disseminated on Telegram channels (@gagauznewsmd, @rusputnikmd, @osnmedia, @+-QH9fZcwOu83ZWRi, @tirdea, etc.) with total views: 77,693 and 173 shares, shared by Nikolai Valuev, the Russian MP on Telegram (827 views and 1 share), and

circulated on 11 Facebook posts (24 comments, 42 reactions and 11 shares) and 2 TikTok posts (> 50,800 views).
Outcome: Official [denial](#) by the Moldovan Presidency.

Key Objectives and Behaviours

- Objective 1:** [T0135.004 Polarise](#) - Exacerbate social divisions by framing PAS and Sandu as betraying Moldova’s neutrality;
- [T0098.002 Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites](#) – Presenting a marginal Turkish-language site as a legitimate news outlet;
- [T0085.002 Develop False or Altered Documents](#) – The supposed “parliamentary correspondence” leak is fabricated to create a veneer of proof;
- [T0118 Amplify Existing Narrative](#) – The false allegation plugs directly into the standing “Moldova is being dragged into war” narrative;
- [T0119.002 Post Across Platform](#) – Rapid cross-posting across Telegram, Russian media sites, Facebook, and TikTok to maximize reach.

Recommendations and Actions Taken

Actions Taken: Fact-check and debunk published by Stopfals.md; official denial by the Moldovan Presidency.

Recommendations:

- Monitor obscure foreign websites (e.g., dikgazete.com, glassmountain.io) for future falsehoods;
- Report coordinated amplification on Facebook, TikTok, and Telegram to relevant platforms;
- Share findings with EU and OSCE election monitoring bodies to raise awareness of electoral disinformation threats.

Report	Threat Actor	Evidence	Authors	Platforms	FIMI Assessment
Link	Russia	Stopfals.md fact-check (29/08/2025); archived dikgazete.com and glassmountain.io articles; Russian media (RIA Novosti, RBK, Lenta, etc.); Telegram channels (Gagauznews, Sputnik, etc.); posts by Russian MP Nikolai Valuev;	Nicolae Tibrigan, Digital Forensic Team, Counter Disinformation Network	Obscure websites, Russian state media, Telegram, Facebook, TikTok	High certainty