BANNER: Moldovan President Maia Sandu casts her ballot during the second round of the presidential election in Chisinau, Moldova on November 3, 2024. (Source: Vladislav Culiomza via Reuters)

Information operations seeking to influence Moldova’s recent presidential election and EU integration referendum targeted the Moldovan diaspora via alternative European media. With more than a third of Moldovans living abroad, the diaspora plays a crucial role in Moldovan politics, contributing around 11.8 percent of the GDP through remittances, and is a key demographic in elections. The results of Moldova’s diaspora vote reflect significant geopolitical divides: Moldovans in Western Europe and North America tended to support pro-EU parties, while those in Russia favored pro-Russian candidates. Electoral participation also varied dramatically. During the 2024 presidential elections, 8,232 Moldovans in Russia voted in the first round, rising to 9,998 in the second round. This was dwarfed by the highly mobilized Western diaspora, where the turnout reached 232,000 in the first round and 318,000 in the second, underscoring the diaspora’s influence on Moldova’s political trajectory.

Ahead of the elections, Pro-Russian propaganda sought to exploit diaspora dynamics by spreading narratives claiming discrimination against Moldovans in Russia and suggesting that operating a limited number of polling stations qualified as voter suppression. These efforts aimed to delegitimize the elections and sow distrust. Additionally, international media sympathetic to Kremlin interests amplified claims of electoral fraud and geopolitical manipulation, specifically targeting Moldova’s Western diaspora. Alternative Western media was key in promoting narratives aligned with Kremlin interests. Outlets like EU Reporter and EU Today published articles aimed at casting doubt on the integrity of the electoral process in Moldova, often timed to coincide with key moments in the election cycle. This synchronization, along with the amplification of narratives on eight other platforms aimed at Western European audiences, appeared designed to maximize the impact of disinformation on Moldovan public opinion.

Ahead of the elections, EU Reporter covered the Moldovan diaspora, reporting on the polling stations opened in Russia and the EU. On October 20, 2024, amid the first round of the presidential elections and the referendum on integration into the EU, EU Reporter published an article titled “Moldovan diaspora in the EU shows little interest in the crucial presidential elections and referendum.” In the article, author Colin Stevens alleges there was low voter turnout in the EU despite the greater number of open polling stations. He contrasts EU turnout with “hundreds of metres-long queues” in Russia. Moldovan authorities previously warned that the crowds at the polling stations in Russia were artificially created to undermine the electoral process. Notably, not all the ballots sent by the Moldovan authorities to the two polling stations in Russia were used. Despite this, the narrative alleging low EU voter turnout was shared on election day by both the Russian press and pro-Russian media in Moldova. It was also widely amplified on Telegram, Facebook, and VKontakte channels, as well as by pro-Russian opposition representatives in Moldova. In addition, although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova warned of attempts to organize the transportation of citizens to polling stations in Russia, in the EU Reporter article, Stevens alleges violations at polling stations in the EU, including illegal transportation, without citing any evidence or sources. Further, the author raised concerns about the transparency of the electoral process, referring to an alleged decision by Moldova’s electoral authority to deny “international organizations observer status” but did not specify which organizations were being referred to.

In this context, on October 18, 2024, two days before the election, EU Reporter published another article, accusing Moldova’s Central Electoral Commission (CEC) of lacking transparency in rejecting requests from European non-governmental organizations that sought to monitor the diaspora elections. EU Reporter refers to eight organizations that allegedly raised alarms about the “opaque registration process of the CEC and the lack of clear guidelines for potential observers.” The DFRLab examined the list of organizations named by EU Reporter and found that many could not be identified online, some had been inactive for several years, and others, while still operational, did not publicly indicate any interest in monitoring the elections in Moldova.

The article insinuated that the CEC’s list of authorized international observers lacked “independent organizations specialized in democratic oversight” and that only organizations “selectively invited by the CEC” were allowed to monitor the elections. EU Reporter concluded that the “exclusion” of European NGOs from monitoring the referendum on Moldova’s EU integration “raises serious concerns regarding the integrity of the electoral process,” “casts a shadow over Moldova’s democratic credibility,” and “contradicts Moldova’s European aspirations.”

However, records show that the CEC accredited 784 international observers from fifty-five organizations. A preliminary report from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) noted that the CEC had refused accreditation for 775 observers from two NGOs linked to a pro-Russian party affiliated with the Kremlin-backed Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, and six potential observers from the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) following checks by Moldova’s Intelligence and Security Service. Despite this, EU Reporter’s article was amplified by at least nine inauthentic X accounts, with most of the accounts primarily spreading pro-Russian messages.

At the same time, the article was amplified on nine other websites affiliated with EU Reporter: London Globe, New York Globe, Globe Nederland, Globo Espana, Le Globe France, Der Globus Deutschland, Globo di Roma and Brussels Standard. On its webpage, EU Reporter lists eleven affiliated websites operating in six languages and targeting audiences in the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium. 

Domain analysis shows that similar companies registered the domains and similar name servers are used across several websites, some of which directly link to Colin Stevens. For instance, the domains london-globe.com and globoespana.com are registered and managed by the British company 123-Reg Limited, while newyorkglobe.org, globenederland.eu, and brusselsstandard.eu are registered through Mesh Digital Limited. However, globenederland.eu and brusselsstandard.eu use the same name servers as london-globe.com ( ivan.ns.cloudflare.com and rosalie.ns.cloudflare.com). Similarly, newyorkglobe.org shares name servers with globoespana.com, globusdeutschland.de, leglobefrance.fr, and globodiroma.it (ns1.speedydns.net and ns2.speedydns.net). While leglobefrance.fr is managed by BLACKNIGHT INTERNET SOLUTIONS LTD, and globodiroma.it by 1API GmbH, both domains are registered by Colin Stevens, who is associated with EU Reporter Ltd and has an address in Cardiff, UK.

Two articles similar to those published by EU Reporter were promoted by the European publication EU Today. On election day, the outlet published an article titled “Elections in Moldova: Low Voter Turnout and Allegations of Irregularities at Polling Stations in the EU.” The article, written by Gary Cartwright, is nearly identical to the one published by EU Reporter, with some sentences reworded but maintaining the same core message.

Cartwright also wrote about the narrative alleging that the CEC refused to register international observers to monitor Moldova’s elections. Again, the article is almost identical to the one published by EU Reporter, except the author also mentioned a letter of refusal supposedly sent by the CEC to the World Council for Public Diplomacy and Community Dialogue (WCPDCD), though the alleged letter was not published online. Additionally, EU Today cited “concerns” expressed by WCPDCD representative Andy Vermaut regarding the fairness of the observer accreditation process. Vermaut describes himself on his LinkedIn page as the president of WCPDCD since 2022 and an EU Climate Pact Ambassador since 2023. His LinkedIn notes that he started working as a journalist at Indegazette last year, where he wrote about the CEC’s refusal to register WCPDCD observers without providing credible evidence that the organization applied or was rejected. WCPDCD lacks an official website, and its Facebook page has only 242 followers. The only information listed about the organization’s activities is that it was founded by Vermaut and Manel Msalmi. Facebook’s profile transparency function shows that the page was created in 2018 under the name “Union Arab Nations – UAN – Newspage,” and later renamed “Union of World Nations – UWN – Newspage” in 2019. In 2022, when Vermaut indicated he took on a leadership role at the organization, it adopted its current name.

Vermaut has been cited several times by the Russian news agency Sputnik International in pieces where he defended Russian news agencies in the EU. On November 28, 2019, Vermaut commented for the Russian publication on allegations regarding pressure from Estonian authorities on the Estonian branches of Russian news agencies Rossiya Segodnya and Sputnik. Although the publications’ activities were affected by the financial sanctions imposed by the European Union in 2014 in light of the events in Ukraine, Vermaut criticized the Estonian authorities for the alleged threats against the publications and for limiting press freedom.

On May 7, 2022, Vermaut, who was cited by the Russian publication as a Belgian human rights activist with the International Alliance for the Defense of Rights and Freedoms, commented on an alleged terrorist attack against journalists from MIA Rossiya Segodnya in Berlin. He suggested that it was an attack on press freedom and the fundamental values of liberty, exacerbated by the rise of Russophobia and anti-Russian propaganda in the West. Later, in a May 25, 2022, Sputnik piece, Vermaut was cited as a member of the European Federation of Journalists, and he defended the Russian media outlets RT and Sputnik after the broadcasters were suspended in the EU as part of the sanctions related to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. “It is inexcusable that we condemn the suppression of freedom of expression everywhere in the world but fail to defend the values that we ourselves promote,” Vermaut told Sputnik International.

Also, for Sputnik International, on October 1, 2020, Vermaut commented on reports regarding the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny in 2020, ridiculing the idea that Russian President Vladimir Putin could be behind the attack. Further, in a June 2024 SputnikNewsAfrica piece, amplified by the French version of the Russian portal Pravda, Vermaut, already presented as the editor-in-chief of the Belgian publication Indegazette, commented on the release of Julian Assange, insinuating that US President Joe Biden might use his release for political advantage ahead of the presidential debates.

The narratives promoted by EU Reporter and EU Today mirror the rhetoric shared by the Kremlin after Moldova’s first-round election results, when it accused Moldovan authorities of employing “anti-democratic methods.” At a press brief on October 23, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova emphasized the contrast in the number of polling stations between Russia and the West, and highlighted “numerous violations and falsifications,” including the organized transportation of voters in Western Europe, referring to the “multitude of video confirmations” online She also noted the “empty polling stations” opened for the Moldovan diaspora in European countries.

Politico reported in 2021 that EU Reporter and EU Today are part of a Brussels-based network of consultants and journalists that promote political lobbying disguised as independent journalism. These platforms present themselves as authentic news sources but publish undifferentiated paid content, blurring the line between journalism and lobbying.

Colin Stevens is a former British TV executive and owner of EU Reporter, while Gary Cartwright, who wrote for EU Today, is the publication’s owner and a former UK Independence Party (UKIP) advisor. In 2023, EU DisinfoLab linked Cartwright and EU Today to a disinformation network supporting the Indian government and Hindu nationalism. Cartwright denied the allegations. Politico also noted that Stevens and Cartwright have worked with foreign governments and multinational clients, often without disclosing this, complicating the identification of those behind certain influence campaigns.

In 2024, EU Reporter published at least seventeen articles that supported the agenda of Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, who lives in exile in Moscow after being sentenced for his role in Moldova’s largest recorded corruption scandal and being internationally sanctioned for attempts to destabilize the country on behalf of the Kremlin.

On election day, EU Reporter published an article titled “International Help Needed: Moldovan Opposition Claims Election Fraud.” The article promoted an open letter from the “Moldovan opposition,” signed exclusively by representatives of the parties in the Victory Political Bloc, affiliated with Ilan Shor, without mentioning Shor’s background. In the letter to European institutions, Shor’s representatives, who were accused by Moldovan authorities of orchestrating a scheme to bribe around 300,000 voters to oppose Moldova’s EU integration, called Moldova’s pro-European government an “unimaginable dictatorship,” accusing it of repressing the opposition and committing violations during the election campaign.

EU Reporter published five other articles on the restrictions applied to the Shor Party, which was declared unconstitutional in 2023, and the closure of its affiliates’ Facebook pages. These articles covered the legal challenges brought by the party’s lawyers to the European Court of Human Rights, accusing Moldova and Meta of censorship. In June 2024, EU Reporter and  EU Today also promoted presidential candidate Victoria Furtună, who was linked by Moldovan journalists to Shor.

Also, EU Reporter amplified the narrative claiming press freedom restrictions in Moldova and accused the government of censorship after it banned Russian TV channels and revoked the licenses of Shor-affiliated stations for national security reasons. The publication shared press releases from Stop Media Ban, an NGO led by Ludmila Belcencova, a former communist MP and pro-Russian journalist, and founded by Alexei Lungu, leader of the Shor-affiliated Chance Party, whose activities were restricted for financial reporting issues.

Ahead of Moldova’s autumn elections, Italian MP Naike Gruppioni criticized, in an article published by EU Reporter, the partial implementation of postal voting for the Moldovan diaspora. In April 2024, Moldovan authorities adopted a law on postal voting for Moldovan citizens in the diaspora for the October elections. The law proposed initially testing this voting method in six countries that met the selection criteria: the United States, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland, with plans to extend it globally next year. However, the law was challenged at the Constitutional Court by a group of MPs affiliated with the Victory bloc, arguing that the new law violates the principle of equality and citizens’ right to free elections. The court declared the bloc’s appeal inadmissible, and the Venice Commission deemed the limited coverage of the pilot program acceptable since it applied to a single election. Despite this, in the EU Reporter article, Gruppioni accused the Moldovan government of undermining the universality and equality of voting. She also questioned the country’s democratic institutions, noting the withdrawal of TV broadcast licenses from channels linked to Shor and those airing Russian programs. The criticism was amplified by six EU Reporter-affiliated websites: London Globe, New York Globe, Globe Nederland, Globo Espana, Globo di Roma, and Brussels Standard. It was also amplified on Telegram by Alexei Lungu, leader of Shor’s Chance Party. Gruppioni, who entered politics in 2022 with the Azione Party and later joined the Italia Viva Party in 2023, was criticized by the European Platform for Democratic Elections in its report on Azerbaijan’s 2024 elections for acting as a false observer, legitimizing the elections while contradicting credible reports of fraud.

Additionally, EU Reporter published six articles by Stanislav Pavlovschi, a former Moldovan judge and head of the newly established NGO, the International Center for the Defense of Human Rights and Democracy. In these articles, he accused Moldova’s government, particularly President Maia Sandu, of authoritarianism, press repression, and suppressing opposition, referring to the Russian media bans and Shor-affiliated parties. Pavlovschi also promoted the narrative that claims Moldova is not ready for EU membership and poses a danger to the EU.

Many of these articles were amplified on EU Reporter’s affiliated platforms, including London Globe, New York Globe, Globe Nederland, Globo Espana, Le Globe France, Der Globus Deutschland, Globo di Roma, Brussels Standard, as well as on EU Today and EINpresswire.

Daniela Calmis, “Alternative European media spread pro-Kremlin narratives targeting Moldova elections,” Digital Forensic Research Lab, December 11, 2024, https://dfrlab.org/2024/12/11/pro-kremlin-narratives-moldova-vote/.