Banner: Visualization of the network analysis conducted for this case study.

Foreign disinformation narratives are often shared across Japanese-language communities on X. Key users, such as the Chinese consul general in Osaka and Japanese politician Kazuhiro Hiraguchi, lead their own communities, while larger communities are made up of active independent users. Foreign-aligned users exploit narratives about natural disaster relief, sovereignty over disputed territories, and the US military presence.

Japan has had to defend itself against foreign malign information operations in recent years. In 2020, the Global Engagement Center found that Japanese X users had been posting links to Kremlin-aligned proxy sites. One of largest information operations targeting Japan in recent years occurred when the Chinese Communist Party decried the release of Fukushima nuclear wastewater into the ocean in 2023. Chinese state media and inauthentic actors like the Spamouflage campaign exaggerated the risks of the wastewater, condemned the Japanese government for the release, and depicted it as a global environmental catastrophe, even sparking boycotts and harassment of Japanese nationals in China.

As a result, the Japanese government seeks to strengthen its disinformation monitoring and response capabilities through additional investment. Japan also signed a memorandum of cooperation with the United States in 2023 and strengthened dialogue with NATO in 2024 to tackle disinformation. Japanese civil society is another pillar in the country’s counter-disinformation strategy, with fact-checking organizations such as the Japan Fact-check Center, Litmus, and InFact being core components.

This case study aims to identify different communities in the Japanese information environment and analyze how they interact to spread foreign disinformation. To do so, we mapped the network of notable users who engage with foreign narratives on X, which is the third most popular platform for news in Japan, behind YouTube and Line.

Our network assembly started with notable foreign state media sources and diplomatic accounts that post in Japanese, such as Sputnik Japan and the Chinese consul general of Osaka, Xue Jian, who is known to practice “wolf warrior” diplomacy, characterized by its assertiveness. We iteratively expanded this network by adding the most reposted accounts by others already in this network, continuing until new candidates showed a substantial drop in engagement.

In total, we identified 66 accounts for our dataset. It’s important to note that not all accounts in this dataset are linked to foreign disinformation; some, like the Japanese public broadcaster NHK, were included simply because they were frequently reposted by others. For these reasons, the dataset is not a network in the sense of it being a self-contained group of accounts working in concert with each other.

Several Okinawan news accounts were also included to assess whether foreign adversaries were engaging with news of regional discontent. CSIS found that Russia and China seek to promote self-determination narratives in Okinawa to fracture society. Separately, Nikkei uncovered a large network of disinformation accounts promoting pro-independence sentiment, primarily targeting Chinese-speaking audiences.

Using data collected between May 1, 2023, and July 15, 2024, we conducted network analysis and visualized the cross-amplification between the 66 accounts using the ORA software developed by CASOS of Carnegie Mellon University. The edge weights are scaled by the number of reposts and quotes from the source account to the target account following a clockwise edge path. The node sizes are scaled by out-degree, which in this instance represents the total number of times an account’s posts were reposted or quoted. The node colors indicate the community groupings categorized using the Leiden clustering algorithm. The parameters were exported and visualized using the D3 JavaScript library to create the interactive network shown below.

Network visualization of interactions between primarily Japanese X accounts that engage with foreign narratives. These accounts were assigned into communities identified by reposting and quoting patterns. (Source: DFRLab and Julia Janicki via Meltwater)

The Leiden clustering algorithm identified seven community clusters, which we assigned the following names:

With the communities categorized, we continued to use ORA to calculate the modularity vitality metric for each user. The lower this metric is, the more these users act as bridging accounts that disseminate narratives between communities through reposts. Sorting by this metric we identified four accounts that act as bridge accounts: Garyu Tsuhin (@wangon2010), Zenrinyuko (@jucundioribus), Bunshu So (@sohbunshu), and Yuka (@d9bf0nrdyrl21ba). We analyze the posts of the last two accounts in greater detail in the following sections.

After conducting the above analysis, we generated a meta-network that shows the strength of the connections between each community shown below. The edge weights are scaled by the number of accounts reposted or quoted by an account in the source community clockwise into an account in the target community. Results show the pro-Russia and the transitional communities are the most strongly connected communities.

Meta-network of X accounts aggregated to their detected communities. Thicker edges indicate more accounts being reposted or quoted from members of one community to another. (Source: DFRLab and Julia Janicki via Meltwater)

To visualize the post contents of the Japanese-speaking accounts in our sample, we analyzed posts from June 2023 to June 2024 using BERTopic, a topic modeling technique, to create this visualization below. The algorithm grouped similar posts together and assigned them into general topic categories. Each “X” marks a user’s average post content relative to this topic distribution. For example, both the Chinese Consulate General in Osaka and the Russian Embassy in Japan accounts are positioned among posts about their respective countries, reflecting their typical content.

Topic modeling graph showing the content distribution of posts by the Japanese-speaking accounts in our sample. An alternate, more detailed, topic modeling graph can be found here. (Source: DFRLab and Julia Janicki via Meltwater

Understanding the messaging tactics requires proper definitions to characterize them. The BEND framework by Dr. Kathleen M. Carley of Carnegie Mellon University provides one such approach and illustrates the narrative and structural “maneuvers” through which we can understand influence campaigns. The framework classifies these maneuvers by target, their narrative or platform, and their constructive or deconstructive nature.

From the pro-Russia community, Himuro (@himuro398) was the most popular account by accumulated views in our sampled timeframe, averaging 235 thousand views per post. He was a self-described “white hat,” a supporter of Donald Trump and Q of QAnon. He frequently posts pro-Russia and anti-vaccine narratives. According to a blogger who documents Japanese conspiracy theorists, Inbouron666, Himuro “has zero originality as a conspiracy theorist” because he primarily regurgitates narratives from elsewhere.

We compiled all the links posted by Himuro and found that Total News World is among his most frequently shared sources. Total News World is a “matome” site, a format popular in Japan that aggregates and republishes content from across the internet, curated to appeal to its targeted niche.  The Japan Fact-check Center has found news from Total News World to be false or misleading on topics such as US politics, gender identity, and vaccines. It is not clear who operates Total News World, but its opposition to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led it to join the Japan Conservative party. Other unreputable matome sites that Himuro shares are RAPT Theory + α, Share News Japan, and Tweetsoku.

Poppin Coco (@PoppinCoco), also from the pro-Russia community, is the second most popular account by accumulated views. In its X bio, the account identifies as anti-globalism, anti-Sustainable Development Goals, anti-NATO, pro-Russia, and pro-Putin. The content shared by Poppin Coco is similar to that of Himuro. Many of its most-viewed posts involve conspiracy theories, including one questioning the moon landing and another linking fluoride to Nazi mind control. One of its most influential posts in the realm of Japanese politics involves amplifying a narrative that the 2024 Kumamoto gubernatorial election was fraudulent due to the timing of the winner’s announcement.

These two accounts have seen explosive growth in the last few years. Himuro and Poppin Coco respectively grew from 600 and 4,500 followers in February 2023 to over 150,000 and 60,000 in December 2024. We believe that part of their popularity can be attributed to their amplification of narratives and disinformation related to Japanese domestic politics, whereas many other accounts in this network focus on international affairs. We were unable to find evidence that Himuro and Poppin Coco are operated by foreign governments, and they appear to be independent bloggers.

Part of the pro-Russia community, translators of anti-Western narratives and conspiracy theories are among the most influential users in this network by accumulated views in our data sample. They curate and translate popular content from their English- and Russian-speaking counterparts, breaking language barriers and bringing narratives and disinformation to Japanese audiences that would otherwise remain inaccessible.

One notable translator is Tamahoi (@Tamama0306), whose translation of an image insinuating that Prime Minister Abe was assassinated due to his vaccination policy garnered 1.1 million views. The image was originally circulated among American right-wing users shortly after Abe’s death in 2022. Following the assassination attempt on Slovakia’s Prime Minister Fico, Tamahoi compiled and translated a montage of speeches by Fico to suggest that he was targeted because of the anti-Ukrainian and anti-vaccine views that they both share.

One of these translators is a seemingly professional news brand called ShortShort News (@ShortShort_News). It operates only on X and does not state any affiliation. We were able to connect ShortShort News to J Sato (@j_sato), a user in the pro-Russia community, through an old ShortShort News video that included a watermark of J Sato’s X handle and a post documenting his translation process. He has been known for spreading anti-vaccine narratives during the pandemic and has since significantly broadened his coverage to include anti-Western narratives and disinformation. We are unable to pinpoint the motives for him to run this news account in addition to his personal account where he posts the same narratives.

J Sato has made use of recent advances in AI to more efficiently translate video propaganda. Since videos on X do not have automatic subtitled translations, some form of captions is needed for their viewers to understand the foreign narratives. J Sato began using a video editing service, VEED, and its AI translation software to boost productivity. He also uses a tool developed by another conspiracy theory translator, Tonakai. His automated translation and subtitling tool uses OpenAI’s speech recognition service, Whisper, and the translation service DeepL for its core functionalities.

We believe these translation accounts are operated by ideologically motivated bloggers rather than by Russia. In addition to conspiracy theories, they occasionally post more personal content including that about their families, hobbies, and even selfies. Tamahoi even got into an argument with ShortShort News about translation accuracy. While likely unconnected to Russia, these accounts have caught the attention of the Russian government accounts, which have begun following several of them.

Other pro-Russia bloggers include accounts such as MK (@mari21sofi), Akichka (@4myeefhha6h1onf), and Vladimir Z (@z58633894). They have similar levels of popularity as the conspiracy theory translators but post more narratives on Ukraine. For example, MK and Akichka respectively promote narratives that Zelenskyy reappropriated funds to purchase an expensive mansion and that the Ukrainian military was harvesting organs from their own dead soldiers for profit. They are active in the Japanese pro-Russia community, often engaging in discussions with like-minded users and amplifying each other’s content. A Japanese Russia disinformation blogger, Right View, documented posts MK and Akichka made about their personal lives suggesting that these accounts seem to be run independently by the supposed personas.

The Chinese consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, (@xuejianosaka) sits at the core of another community of accounts. Xue and the accounts in this community post and amplify pro-China and anti-Western narratives, for example, posts denigrating Taiwanese sovereignty (especially after notable events in Taiwan) and general anti-US posts highlighting its domestic issues.

Xue relies on Chinese content farm accounts to amplify his posts and provide him with content to repost. Content farms such as @xiaxiayiyi and @liguihong0625 primarily post generic tourism content that Xue reposts to promote Chinese culture to Japan, which also speaks to China’s foreign propaganda strategy of “telling China’s story well.” These content farms are very likely affiliated with him because his account is essentially the only one interacting with them. These content farms rarely translate their posts to Japanese, yet Xue still reposts them multiple times per day.

The Asia Press Club (APC) (@2018_apc) appears to be an ordinary press club in Japan, an organization that grants journalists exclusive access to sources, but its X account frequently posts pro-China narratives, and its leader was prominently featured by official Chinese outlets. For example, its pinned post denies the Xinjiang genocide and links to an article by Record China. Researcher Maiko Ichihara and the Doublethink Lab have found evidence of Record China, technically a Japanese publication, being indirectly controlled by China. The secretary general of APC, Taihei Morihiro (森広泰平), has been featured on CRI (Chinese state media) to call accusations of abuses in Xinjiang a “part of America’s hybrid war against China.” He has also attended a symposium about Japanese war crimes held at the Chinese Consulate General in Osaka, hosted by Xue.

Bunshu So (@sohbunshu) was a Chinese businessman in Japan and now uses his fluency to post pro-China narratives to his Japanese followers. He is one of the accounts that connect communities through reposts (the Bridge BEND maneuver). When China put its propaganda machine in full force during the nuclear wastewater disinformation campaign, he popularized a video adding to the fearmongering. When China landed a spacecraft on the moon in June 2024, he amplified content that implies the US faked the moon landing. Around June 4, during the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre, he justified the Chinese government’s violent putdown of the protests while alleging the CIA was manipulating the online conversation surrounding it (while amplifying a Chinese video translated by ShortShort News depicting the protestors as reckless arsonists). His messaging strategy mirrors that of official Chinese media, alternating between political narratives and posts about Chinese culture and innovation. Another popular user in this network, Sakemoto Masao (@SakemotoMasao), frequently replies to Bunshu with content that augments his original posts.

Yuka (@d9bf0nrdyrl21ba), is another pro-China blogger and Bridge account, a self-described “rural aunt.” Her pro-China posts are fairly ordinary in the sense that they conform to narratives that already exist.. Some of her most viewed posts this year criticize the Japanese government’s disaster response following the 2024 Noto earthquake. She praised the disaster response of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, contrasting the rescue efforts. As shown in this case below, Yuka’s messaging exhibits the following BEND maneuvers: Negate to undermine confidence in the government, Excite to generate admiration for the Chinese system, and Distract to complain about the United States. The slow relief response and poor communication by the government during the earthquake are legitimate concerns. However, as Japan’s geography makes it naturally more exposed to earthquakes and typhoons, narratives of disaster response are Japan-specific vulnerabilities likely exploited by foreign-aligned users to push their broader interests.

Kazuhiro Haraguchi (原口一博) is a Japanese elected official of the Constitutional Democratic Party and an active disseminator of conspiracy theories. He represents the National Diet and was considered a contender for prime minister in 2011 due to his position as a former Minister of Internal Affairs and Communication. He has been active on Twitter since at least 2010 and uses it to criticize the incumbent party, as expected of his role as the opposition. However, in seeking anti-government content, he gravitated toward pro-China influencers and Russian state media, habitually sharing their posts and sometimes even adding his own conspiratorial spin.
According to the Community Notes Leaderboard, as of October 2024, he and Himuro were among the top 50 users globally to have the most community notes attached to their posts. Haraguchi is the only active politician in this community, and with his popularity and political power, arguably the most important user in this entire network.

Haraguchi is known for his conspiracy theories involving the deep state, referred to as “DS” in his posts. He believes that the deep state is a hidden force controlling Japan, mirroring the same conspiracy theory that is popular within American right-wing communities. This belief connects him with Naoya Fujiwara, an economist and political commentator, forming a two-man community according to our network graph. Other users in the network with direct connections to him are visualized in a sphere of influence graph below.

Sphere of influence graph centered on Kazuhiro Haraguchi, showing direct reposting and quoting patterns to and from him. (Source: DFRLab and Julia Janicki via Meltwater)

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Haraguchi has been repeating Russian narratives. As seen in the network graph above, he reposts content from the aforementioned media accounts, bestowing legitimacy to these accounts as a politician. The Ukrainian OSINT agency Molfar has labeled him a pro-Russia foreign propagandist; in September 2023, he posted a YouTube video in which he repeated pro-Russian narratives like “NATO’s eastward expansion led to Russia’s war” and “Japan is behind the neo-Nazi regime.” Due to this video, the Embassy of Ukraine in Japan expressed “deep concern” and a senior member of his party reprimanded him. Even after this diplomatic incident, Haraguchi remained pro-Russia. In an interview with the Russian state media Sputnik in February 2024, Haraguchi also made arguments similar to Yuka’s, the abovementioned pro-China blogger, that Japan needs to prioritize recovery following the Noto Earthquake over helping Ukraine.

Haraguchi is also an outspoken critic of vaccines. For instance, he blamed the COVID-19 vaccine for other illnesses he contracted in the same period. He encourages offline activity, breaking his narratives from the Japanese-speaking X community into global discourse. He urged his supporters to attend a protest in Tokyo against the World Health Organization’s talks to sign a pandemic agreement and amend the International Health Regulations. His speech at the event has been translated and his message spread to global anti-vaccination communities, prompting fact-checkers to respond. The protest was partly organized by the World Council for Health, a pseudo-science organization for which Kazuhiro serves as an advisor to the Japanese chapter. Afterward, he and his international supporters claim it was one of the largest protests against the WHO in the world.

As a result of its geography, Japan is uniquely exposed to disaster relief narratives, as explored in the above cases of Yuka and Haraguchi. In addition, Japan has territorial disputes and historical grievances that can be exploited by China and Russia. Japan and Russia both claim four islands in northeastern Japan, called the Northern Territories by Japan, but they remain under Russian occupation. The pro-Russia X community and Haraguchi amplified the disinformation narrative that Russia is open to returning these territories to Japan, but the United States would immediately arm the territories with weapons pointed at Russia.

American military bases in Okinawa and Okinawa’s past as an independent kingdom are divisive issues also exploited by users in our sample. Analysis from Nikkei concludes that China is preparing to target the prefecture in its Japan strategy, bringing up its special status to counter interference in Taiwan. Compared to other topics such as vaccines, Ukraine, and domestic politics, Okinawa is not regularly mentioned in our sample (as shown through our topic modeling graph). But when major news about American bases in Okinawa, such as the recurring issue of sexual assault cases by American soldiers stationed there, the users in our sample amplify those stories heavily.

Some pro-China users stoke support for Okinawan independence and blame the US for aiding in oppressing Okinawans’ local identity. One of them is Robert Kajiwara, a Japanese advocate for Okinawan independence who was featured in Chinese state media and writes in Chinese to build a Chinese audience. Perhaps due to the difference in the intended audience, his posts are rarely amplified by other users of the network despite their narrative value for the goal of building a close relationship between China and a would-be-independent Okinawa.

Julia Janicki is a data journalist and data visualization developer. She is particularly interested in working on topics related to the environment, biodiversity conservation, science and technology, culture, and democracy. She worked on this project until September 2024. You can see some of her work here: https://juliahanjanicki.com.