WASHINGTON, DC — Information manipulation campaigns are increasingly being used as tools to undermine democratic institutions, erode public trust, and exploit social and political divisions in the South Caucasus and the Eastern European countries. These efforts often involve the spread of false narratives, manipulation of public opinion, and interference in key democratic processes, including elections. Such activities not only threaten the stability and security of these nations but also highlight the growing regional challenge of combating information manipulation in a rapidly evolving digital landscape. 

To address these issues, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, in collaboration with the Info Ops Poland Foundation, has launched a project, supported by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Public Diplomacy 2024-2025 – European Dimension and Countering Disinformation’ grant.  The project, led by Givi Gigitashvili, focuses onfocuses on strengthening the capabilities of local stakeholders in Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia in identifying and countering domestic and foreign information manipulations. The project also aims to identify and expose hostile influence campaigns and to pinpoint information threats that undermine the integrity of the information landscape.  

During the first phase of the project, both organizations published a body of research, documenting a wide range of techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs) employed by hostile actors to undermine democratic processes in project countries. In the first article about Moldova, the DFRLab covered pro-Russian disinformation efforts in the lead-up to the 2024 presidential election and EU accession referendum, including the dissemination of fabricated documents, anti-EU ads on Meta platforms, and Telegram chatbots offering financial incentives to oppose EU membership. These tactics sought to exploit societal divisions, manipulate public opinion, and derail the country’s pro-European trajectory by undermining electoral integrity and influence the referendum outcome. Info Ops article about Moldova highlighted Russia’s effort to destabilise Moldova through pro-Russian networks, training activists to provoke unrest, and disseminating false narratives designed to instill fear about EU integration.  

The DFRLab’s publication on Georgia highlighted how protests against the foreign agent law showcased the media’s role in shaping public opinion. Opposition outlets framed the law as a threat to democracy and EU integration, resonating with younger, pro-European audiences. Meanwhile, pro-government narratives advocating sovereignty and transparency struggled to gain traction. This highlighted the polarized media landscape and its power to mobilize public sentiment during national crises. A recent Info Ops study sheds light on Russia’s ongoing influence in Georgia, tracking its progression from historical military actions and political interference to contemporary tactics such as cultural initiatives, disinformation campaigns, and the use of soft power institutions, emphasizing the serious risks these activities pose to Georgia’s sovereignty and democratic development.  

Ukraine faced disinformation campaigns on platforms like Telegram and Facebook, where fake accounts spread anti-Ukrainian narratives targeting its leadership and alliances. The DFRLab analyzed over 500,000 interactions in late 2024, uncovering tactics to destabilize the country by amplifying misinformation and divisive content. The findings underscore the scale and sophistication of these campaigns. An Info Ops article highlights how the Ukraine war extends into information warfare, with Russian disinformation since 2022 serving as a key weapon. It identifies three phases aimed at deceiving, destabilizing, and influencing local and global audiences.   

Last but not least, the DFRLab analyzed how Russia and Azerbaijan efforts to undermine Armenia’s pro-European aspirations are aligned. State-controlled media in Russia and Azerbaijan framed Armenia’s aspirations to integrate into Western institutions as destabilizing. The disinformation campaigns illustrate a broader geopolitical struggle, with Armenia striving for greater independence and democratic reform against persistent external pressure from regional actors to maintain the status quo. An Info Ops article details Russia’s influence in Armenia through economic dependence, propaganda, and soft power, highlighting Kremlin’s strategic role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to sustain dominance. 

The findings from this project underline the complexity and evolving nature of information warfare in these two regions. Beyond exposing individual campaigns, they offer a blueprint for understanding and countering disinformation strategies that threaten democratic progress. By fostering collaboration and building local expertise, initiatives like this can not only mitigate immediate threats but also contribute to a more informed and resilient society. This work serves as a reminder that addressing disinformation is not just about countering falsehoods but about reinforcing the values of transparency, accountability, and democratic integrity in an interconnected world.