Foreign Information Manipulation and Interferences (FIMI)
Fri, Apr 3, 2026
How Sputnik Czechia’s successor adapted to circumvent sanctions
The rebranded site adapted its operations to shield itself from Czech enforcement
Tue, Mar 31, 2026
Foreign and domestic: Information manipulation during elections in Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan
Recent elections in Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan reveal how foreign and domestic actors intertwine to shape information environments, exploiting narratives, digital platforms, and political vulnerabilities to influence electoral discourse.
Tue, Mar 31, 2026
Polskanews.org: a foreign influence operation masquerading as Polish news
Linguistic, technical, and behavioral forensics uncover an influence operation against Poland bearing Russian-language fingerprints
by Andreas Sjöstedt (Erebusintel.io ) and Givi Gigitashvili (DFRLab)
Tue, Mar 31, 2026
Gagauznews rebrands to launder sanctioned content into Moldova
A rebrand to Media Pulse Moldova allowed the operation to continue amplifying sanctioned content
Fri, Mar 20, 2026
Romanian channel launders sanctioned Russian content for domestic audiences
News Time Romania systematically translates and republishes material from SouthFront, Rybar, and Alexander Dugin across TikTok and Telegram.
Thu, Jan 15, 2026
Building a common operational picture of FIMI: Using IMS to strengthen technical attribution and disruption
Based on a months-long working group, this report operationalizes the Information Manipulation Set (IMS) framework to strengthen the analysis, attribution, and disruption of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI).
